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Abstract
This paper has three goals. The first, and perhaps the most important, is to provide a new compilation
of data on ethnic, linguistic and religious composition at the sub-national level for a large number of
countries. This data set allows us to measure segregation of different ethnic, religious and linguistic
groups within the same country. The second goal is to correlate measures of segregation with measures
of quality of the polity and policymaking. The third is to construct an instrument that helps to overcome
the endogeneity problem which arises because groups move within country borders, partly in response
to policies. We find that more ethnically and linguistically segregated countries, i.e., those where groups
live more spatially separately, have a substantially lower quality of government. In contrast, we find no
relationship between religious segregation and the quality of government.
∗For editor and referees: this version of the paper is long because we wanted to be as clear as possible regarding the
construction of the data set and the instrument to facilitate the editorial review. If needed the paper can be shortened and
additional material can be made available on the web.
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1 Introduction
Racial and religious conflicts are often associated with poor politico-economic performance, especially in
developing countries. Economists have recently turned their attention to ethno-linguistic fractionalization
as an explanation of differences in the pace of development, starting with an influential paper by Easterly
and Levine (1997). Since then, many others have shown how fractionalization is negatively correlated with
a host of policy variables, such as the quality of government, indices of development, etc.1 However, many
ethnically diverse countries (the United States, for instance) are quite successful. What makes different
countries more or less capable of handling diversity or even of benefitting from it remains an open question.2
Due to lack of data, existing cross-country literature rarely considered the issue of segregation. That is,
two hypothetical countries with, for example, two equally sized groups would have the same fractionalization
index (1/2) regardless of how the groups are distributed geographically within the country. Yet one might
expect outcomes to vary with segregation, from complete separation (e.g., one group living in the northern
half of the country and the other in the southern half) to total integration (i.e., the members of the groups
are uniformly distributed throughout the country).
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. More specifically, our contribution is fourfold: first and
perhaps most importantly, we present a new data set on the composition of ethnic, linguistic and religious
groups at the sub-national (regional) level for a large number of countries (97 for ethnicity, 92 for language,
and 78 for religion).3 These data allow us to compute both an index of fractionalization and an index of
segregation at the national level, as well as an index of fractionalization at the sub-national level. We find
that the level of segregation varies vastly across countries and the national-level fractionalization is often
different from subnational fractionalization. Second, we relate our index of segregation to measures of the
quality of government. We find that, controlling for fractionalization at the national level and for the level
of development, higher segregation in terms of ethnicity and language is associated with significantly lower
quality of government. The negative correlation between ethnic and linguistic segregation and the quality of
government is especially large in democracies, a result that may suggest some role for voting as a transmission
1See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey. For quality of government in particular, see La Porta et al. (1999). Alesina
and Glaeser (2004) show that redistributive policies are less extensive in more fractionalized countries.
2For some discussion of whether democracy and/or development helps, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
3The precise definition of linguistic versus ethnic groups is given below.
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mechanism. In contrast, there is no correlation between religious segregation and the quality of government.
Third, we recognize that, at least up to a point, the geographical distribution of groups is endogenous to
policy choices. Populations move in response to national and local policies as well as economic shocks. In
addition, the choice of internal borders may depend on factors correlated with government quality. To cope
with the endogeneity of segregation, we suggest and compute an instrument based upon the composition of
major groups in bordering countries. More specifically, we construct an index of predicted segregation based
on the idea that if the home country has a group that is also present in a neighboring country, this group is
likely to be concentrated near the border of the two countries. Conversely, if the home country has a group
not present in any of the neighboring countries, that group is likely to be distributed uniformly. Finally, we
use this instrument to establish the causal significant negative effect of ethnic and linguistic segregation on
the quality of government. Instrumental variables estimation confirms that there is no relationship between
religious segregation and the quality of government. The purpose of our instrument is to take care of
endogeneity related to Tiebout sorting within countries and to formation of internal borders.
There are several possible and non-mutually-exclusive explanations for our findings. One is that, if certain
groups choose to live separately, it is because they feel more animosity towards each other and they disagree
more on how to conduct public policies, leading to a deterioration of the quality of government (see Alesina,
Baqir and Easterly 1999). On the other hand segregation itself may feed into more animosity, as in Glaeser
(2005). It is hard to disentangle whether it is animosity that leads to segregation or it is the other way
around, since animosity is hard to measure with any precision for the large number of groups which we
consider.4 Therefore, one cannot separately estimate the effects of the two—animosity and segregation—in
isolation. We discuss this issue below. Geographical concentration of ethnic groups may also exacerbate
“ethnic voting” (i.e., different ethnicities voting for candidates who represent their group, regardless of their
quality). In this paper, we show that segregation increases incidence of ethnic parties. The ethnic voting
effect would hold only in democracies. Banerjee and Pande (2007) provide evidence from India that ethnic
voting reduces the quality of politicians. Geographical separation of groups may also exacerbate conflicts
over allocation of public goods across regions and their financing by identifying the beneficiaries of local
4Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) use genetic distance to measure how far apart groups are. In principle, genetic distance could
proxy for animosity; but this variable was computed only for a very small number of groups. We consider many more groups
and, therefore, genetic distances cannot be used in our framework.
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public goods in terms of different ethnic groups. In some cases, geographical segregation leads to a threat of
secession, putting additional stress on the central government, which may have to spend additional resources
on appeasement or repression rather than on productive public goods and local governance (see Dewatripont
and Roland (1997) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003) for the models of secession threats).
The only two papers on the effects of segregation in a cross-section of countries (that we are aware of)
are Matuszeski and Schneider (2006) and Uslander (2008). The former construct an index of clustering
of linguistic groups based on digital linguistic maps and show that it is significantly correlated with the
incidence of civil conflict. Their method, based upon maps, does not allow to identify and measure groups
living in large and densely populated metropolitan areas. Uslander (2008) uses Minorities at Risk data
base to build a measure of segregation of minorities and shows that it is significantly correlated with trust.
The measures of segregation used in these papers are fairly crude due to data limitations and neither of the
papers addresses causality issues.
There is, of course, a vast literature on segregation in US cities, which focuses on three issues: i) measures
of segregation (see Echenique and Fryer 2008 for a recent contribution), ii) explanations for the evolution
of segregation (see, for instance, Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 1999 and the references cited therein) and iii)
the effect of segregation on the socioeconomic performance of minorities (Kain 1968, 1992, Jenks and Meyer
1990, Cutler and Glaeser 1997 and Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 2008). There has been little research on
the effects of segregation on the quality of government. An exception is La Ferrara and Mele (2006). They
consider the effect of racial segregation in US cities (Metropolitan Statistical Areas) and find that more
racial segregation has a positive impact on average public school expenditure but leads to more inequality
of school spending across school districts.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical arguments which relate variation
in segregation to government policies. In section 3, we describe the data on group composition at the sub-
national level that we have assembled. Section 4 discusses the construction of indices of segregation using
these data. Section 5 presents the correlations between segregation measures and the quality of government.
In section 6, we present our instrument for segregation and the results of instrumental variables estimation
of the effect of segregation on the quality of government. In section 7, we consider alternative measures of
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the quality of government. Section 8 presents evidence of the relationship between segregation and ethnic
parties. Section 9 discusses the robustness of the results; and the last section concludes.
2 Theoretical Arguments
Several different arguments relate segregation and good governance. We review them in order.
2.1 Ethnic animosity, segregation and production of good public goods
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) provide a simple model which shows that the supply of productive public
goods (i.e., good government) is lower when the disagreement amongst voters is larger. The crucial point of
these models is that the larger the differences of views over the nature of a public good and public polices,
the larger the distance from an average voter’s ideal policy to the median voter’s winning policy simply
because the variance of views is larger. Therefore, the value of the public good is on average low relative to
private consumption; and the amount of the productive public good decreases with disagreement on “which
type” of public good to provide. As a result, it is better to have private goods and disregard the public
sphere when disagreement over public policies leads most people to be unhappy about these policies. The
argument can easily be extended to interpret the public good more broadly as the investment in cooperative
behavior to run a good government. Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004) extend this model to show that with
heterogenous preferences people may choose to separate into different jurisdictions, i.e they would choose to
segregate.5
Those ethnic groups which choose to leave apart may do so because they feel animosity towards each other,
have different views about policies, dislike sharing public goods and do no cooperate well in the polity. In turn,
geographic separation may increase animosity. For example, in countries where ethnic groups are segregated
ethnic hatred may be exacerbated because members of different groups have less objective information about
each other and, therefore, views of representatives of a particular group about representatives of other groups
can more easily be manipulated by special interests or politicians playing an ethnic card. Glaeser (2005)
in his model of the ethnic card discussed several examples of racial stereotyping used as a tool of political
competition. This mechanism in turns increase animosity amongst groups and work to the extent that
5See also Alesina and Spolaore (2003) on this point.
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individual cannot gather unbiased information about others. In addition, nation-building policies which
potentially alleviate ethnic animosity, such as teaching a common language in schools across different ethnic
communities (e.g., Miguel 2004), have lower political support if ethnic communities are segregated. These
arguments imply that more segregation is correlated with more animosity and that segregation may feed the
latter. Note that a test of this channel would imply a negative correlation of segregation with the quality
of government at the national level and a positive correlation of segregation with quality of government at
the local level since with more segregation localities are more uniform. Unfortunately, data on the quality of
government at the local level do not exist on a comparable basis for a large sample of countries, but future
research using our segregation data may get to this more stringent test.
One, however, could also think of an opposite effect in which segregation reduces animosity. Close contact
with individuals of different ethnicity may exacerbate differences in views and ideology. If that were the case
our results on a negative effect of segregation of public policies and good governance could not be attributed
to a positive correlation between segregation and animosity. Luttmer (2001) for instance argues that in the
US close contact with individuals of a different race who are on welfare reduces support for welfare spending
pointing in the direction of a negative correlation between animosity and segregation.
2.2 Threats of secession
Different ethnic groups may prefer to form their own country and break away from the original multi-
ethnic polity. The threat of secession of a minority group is more serious if the group is segregated and
lives near the border of the original country, e.g., Quebec in Canada, Catalonia in Spain, or Chechnya in
Russia. In addition, the threat of separation is even stronger if the minority group is segregated near the
border with a country in which the same group is heavily represented. Alesina and Spolaore (2003) and
Dewatripont and Roland (1997) for theoretical models of secession threats.6 Separation threats may require
either repression with force or transfers to the region which threatens to break away. Even a cursory look
around the world confirms the presence of both. This government activity may detract from investment in
nation-wide productive public goods and interfere with good governance.
Note that the threats of secession are influenced by complex geographical features of countries. A seg-
6Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2009) construct a variable which measures ethnic groups separated by the border of two
countries. We both use their original variable and extend it using our data in this paper.
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regated group near a border is a necessary condition but the presence or absence of certain geographical
features like mountain chains and deserts would also influence the severity of the threats. Herbts (2000)
provides an excellent account of the difficulty of state building in Africa due to ethnic conflict and bor-
der problems. Future research could investigate the interaction of segregation of groups, geography and
succession threats using our data.
2.3 Ethnic Voting
In many countries there are parties whose basis is mostly or exclusively ethnic. Ethnically based parties
are more interested in redistribution towards their ethnic base rather than the good of the politics as a
whole. Banerjee and Pande (2007) show how ethnic voting may reduce the quality of government and
also the quality of politicians: in an ethnically-based polity, politicians tend to be chosen because of their
ethnicity rather than competence. Banerjee and Pande also present convincing evidence from India of a
strong negative correlation between ethnic voting and the quality of policies delivered by local governments.
Ethnic voting is made easier by segregation especially when voting is district based. In a segregated district,
ethnic-based politicians do not have to compete with other ethnic groups and can more easily base their
policies on ethnic redistribution. In a multi-ethnic district, may not be so easy for politicians to target a
single ethnic group in order to be elected. Obviously, the design of electoral districts is not exogenous as
the literature on gerrymandering well explains. Obviously with segregation ethically based gerrymandering
is easier to design.
With segregation it is much easier for an elected politicians to favor (or discriminate against) a certain
group. It is enough to locate certain public goods to one region rather than other or device interregional
transfer scheme with certain characteristics. Naturally, the effect of segregation on ethnic voting and the
presence of ethnic parties is relevant only for democracies, as it works through elections. In this paper, we
present evidence that the (negative) correlation between segregation and quality of government is stronger
in democracies. We also find that segregation is an important determinant of the presence of ethnic parties
in the national politics across countries. Furthermore, one may argue that different voting rules (which are
themselves endogenous, however) may amplify the effects of segregation on ethnic voting and the presence
of ethnic parties. A stringent test of this hypothesis would imply interacting measures of segregation with
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measures of voting rules; we leave this test for future research as we do not have valid instruments for voting
rules.7
2.4 Our tests
In this paper we present the first compilation of data on segregation of groups in a large sample of countries.
With these data we examine the correlation between segregation and the quality of government. We also
provide an instrument which helps reducing problems of reverse casualty and omitted variables. In addition,
provide some evidence that ethnic voting is an important but not the only channel through which segre-
gation affects the quality of government. Data availability does not allow us to make further progress in
distinguishing various channels which may explain these correlations, but our data on segregation make a
step towards future research in this direction.
3 Data
We construct three data sets with ethnic, linguistic and religious composition of sub-national administrative
units (regions) in each country. We apply the classification of groups used in Alesina et al. (2003), a paper
that has produced a widely used data set for fractionalization at the national level. That paper extends the
“traditional” ethno-linguistic fractionalization index based upon the Atlas Narodov Mira, used by Easterly
and Levine (1997) and many other authors since. Alesina et al. (2003) break the index into its ethnic and
linguistic components by focusing not only on linguistic differences but also on other pertinent differences
between relevant groups. These authors, then, construct one index based exclusively on language and another
that combines a classification of language, self-reported ethnicity, and physical features, primarily skin color.8
In many cases, people identify with a particular ethnic group based only on the commonality of their
mother tongue; in these cases, ethnic and linguistic groups coincide. In some countries, however, the use
of separate classifications for language and ethnicity produces substantially different measures of diversity.
Consider the US: according to a linguistic classification, whites and African Americans would belong to the
same group, but according to the ethnic index they would not, since their skin colors are different. These
7See Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2008) on this point and on evidence from US cities.
8They use skin color to identify groups in the ethnicity component whenever this information is available. When data on
skin color are unavailable, groups are identified according to self-identification of people into particular ethnic groups. By using
additional sources, they also expand on the number of countries in the Atlas. As data sources, they used the Encyclopaedia
Brittanica and the CIA Factbook.
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two criteria make a lot of difference in other parts of the world as well. For instance, some Latin American
countries (e.g., Brazil and Ecuador) are much more homogeneous in terms of language than in terms of
ethnicity. This is because different ethnic groups such as whites, mulattos and blacks speak the language of
former colonizers (i.e., Portuguese or Spanish).
In the present paper, we consider the same three dimensions of diversity as in Alesina et al. (2003): i)
ethnicity, for which we have 97 countries, ii) language, for which we have 92 countries, and iii) religion, for
which we have 78 countries. The median number of groups is six for ethnicity and five for language and
religion. The maximum number of groups within a country is 55 for ethnicity, 34 for language and 13 for
religion. Note that each group is treated identically; we make no attempt to measure the “distance” between
groups (i.e., the degree of difference between different languages, ethnicities, physical features or religions).9
Our geographical unit of observation is a region, i.e., a sub-national administrative unit of each country.
For each region, we collected data on the total population size and the fraction of the population that
belongs to a certain linguistic, ethnic or religious group. We drew data from the Census closest to the year
2000 whenever its results were available. The second source of data we turned to whenever census data
were unavailable is the statistics published by the national statistical offices of the countries. If neither of
these two sources were available, we relied on the regionally-representative Demographic and Health Surveys
(www.measuredhs.com). For the vast majority of countries, at least one of these three sources was available.
In a few cases, however, we had to rely on the results of published demographics research. Table A.1 in the
Appendix describes in detail the data sources.
The quality of data available for the regional composition of groups varies by country. Interestingly, it
is often the case in this data set that data are “better” for developing than for developed countries. For
example, the censuses of some countries in Western Europe after WWII deliberately do not ask questions
about ethnic identity. Therefore, we had to rely on information about the birthplace of naturalized migrants
and citizenship of non-naturalized migrants to proxy for ethnic composition. We have classified countries
into “high” and “low” data quality (12 countries got a “low” score for quality of data on ethnicity; 3 for
language and only one for religion). The results do not vary much between the sample which includes all
9See Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) on this question.
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countries and the sample with high-quality data only.
The first consistency check on our data is as follows. For each country, we started with our regional data
and aggregated them to the national level. We constructed the index of fractionalization at the national
level for each country i and for each dimension of diversity, i.e., ethnicity, language, and religion. The
fractionalization index captures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a certain country
belong to different groups and is equal to 1-Herfindahl index:
F i =
Mi∑
m=1
piim(1 − piim),
where i indexes countries; m indexes groups and M i is the total number of groups in the country i. piim
is the fraction of group m in the country i. Then, we compared the resulting indices to the corresponding
indices compiled by Alesina et al. (2003) directly from the national-level data. The correlation between the
indices from the two data sources is very high. For language and ethnicity, correlation coefficients are above
0.9, and in the case of the high-quality samples, they are 0.97. For religion, the correlation coefficients are
slightly lower for both samples: namely, about 0.84.
Using our data, we can compute fractionalization indices of different regions within countries. For each
region j of country i we calculate the indices of fractionalization (F ij ) based upon our three dimensions of
diversity. The formula for regional-level fractionalization is as follows:
F ij =
Mi∑
m=1
piijm(1 − piijm),
where i indexes countries (as above); j indexes regions; and piijm stands for the fraction of group m in region
j of country i.
In the data there is no obvious pattern in the relationship between national-level and regional-level
fractionalization indices. In some countries regional-level fractionalization indices do not differ much from
national-level fractionalization. Of course, this is the case in very homogenous countries, such as Ireland and
Costa Rica in terms of linguistic composition. But, this also happens in very fractionalized countries, such
as Australia in terms of religion, where national fractionalization is 0.77, whereas regional fractionalizations
range from 0.72 to 0.78 with a standard deviation (SD) of only 0.02. Another example is Bolivia, which
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has an ethnic national fractionalization of 0.74 and regional fractionalization indices ranging from 0.59 to
0.73 with a SD of 0.04. In other countries, national fractionalization turns out to be a lot higher than
all regional fractionalizations, in other words, regions turn out to be a lot more homogenous than the
whole country. For example, national-level linguistic fractionalization in Nigeria is 0.42, while the largest
regional fractionalization is only 0.22. Finally, it is often also the case that a country has relatively small
national fractionalization, but some regions within it are very fractionalized. For example, in Colombia the
national linguistic fractionalization is 0.06 while regional fractionalization is 0.5 in Amazonas and Vichada
regions (“departments”); similarly, the national religious fractionalization in Indonesia is 0.2, while regional
fractionalization indices are about 0.6 in the West Kalimantan and Maluku provinces. The great diversity of
the observed patterns suggests that the national-level fractionalization index is hardly a sufficient statistic
to describe diversity within countries.
4 Indices of Segregation
Based on information on the group composition in sub-national regions, we construct an index of segregation
which assumes a value of 1 if each group occupies a separate region and therefore each region is fully
homogeneous, even though the country as a whole is fractionalized. The index assumes a value of 0 if each
region has the same composition as the country as a whole.
Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) derive, summarize, and compare several alternative indices of segregation.
Based on their analysis, we define our baseline index of segregation for country i as follows:
Si =
1
M i − 1
Mi∑
m=1
Ji∑
j=1
tij
T i
(piijm − piim)2
piim
,
where T i is the total population of country i and tij is the population of region j in country i. J
i is the total
number of regions in country i. The rest of the notation is as above. In particular, piim is the fraction of
group m in country i, and piijm is the fraction of group m in region j of country i. To avoid cluttering from
now on, we drop the superscript i that indicates the country.
If each region is comprised of a separate group, then the index is equal to 1, and this is the case of full
segregation. If every region has the same fraction of each group as the country as a whole, the index is equal
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to 0, and we take this as the case of no segregation. S is increasing in the square deviation of regional-level
fractions of groups relative to the national average. It is usually referred to as the “squared coefficient of
variation.” The index gives higher weight to the deviation of group composition from the national average
in bigger regions than in smaller regions. Scaling by the total number of groups keeps the index between 0
and 1.
S is defined for the full set of M groups. One important consideration in applying this formula to the
data relates to how to classify the “other” category: that is, in many regions of many countries, a certain
share of the population is not classified (i.e., classified as “other”). There are different ways of treating the
group (or non-group) “other.” The simplest but least appropriate would be to treat this group as any of the
identified groups. This is not satisfactory precisely because the classification of “other” captures tiny groups
or mixed groups. If the group “other” were a clearly identifiable homogenous group, it would most likely be
classified as such.
An alternative is to assume that the group “others” is composed of a number of distinct and small
subgroups O that data availability does not permit us to properly classify. Assume also that there is no
segregation within the “other” category, i.e., the subgroups of the “other” category are uniformly distributed
across all regions. Denote the number of identified groups by N . Then, under these assumptions, one can
rewrite the formula for the segregation index S as follows:
Ŝ =
1
N +O − 1
 N∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
tj
T
(pijm − pim)2
pim
+ So
 ,
where
So =
J∑
j=1
tj
T
(pijo − pio)2
pio
.
pio is the fraction of “others” in the whole population and pijo is the fraction of others in the region j.
Thus, in this case, the segregation index is equal to the sum of the two components – the segregation among
identified groups and the segregation of the “other group” treated as a single group (So) – divided by the
total number of groups (N +O) minus one.10
In order to calculate Ŝ, one needs to assess the number of subgroups within the “other” category (O).
10If one were to treat “others” as a single homogenous group, the segregation index S would be equal to N
N+O−1 bS.
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It is reasonable to assume that none of the subgroups in “others” is larger than the smallest group that is
explicitly classified. Thus, we set the number of “others” subgroups O equal to the number of people in
“others” divided by the size of the smallest identified group. The rationale is clear: the assumption is that
the individuals who are not explicitly classified into groups are those who belong to tiny groups that are
“missed” by the census or the national statistical office precisely because they are small.11
Another approach would be to simply ignore the group “other” altogether and redefine the index of
segregation for the N groups not defined as “other.” In this case, segregation could be measured as follows:
S˜ =
1
N − 1
N∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
tj
T
(pijm − pim)2
pim
.
Note that, under the assumptions underlying the distribution of “others,” the index Ŝ is a theoretically
correct definition of segregation. In contrast, the index S˜ is an approximation, since we are ignoring a certain
share of the population defined as “other.”12
Let us now describe how these indices of segregation apply to the actual data. The first thing to note is
that the two indices Ŝ and S˜ are very highly correlated: 0.96 – for ethnicity, 0.80 – for language, and 0.86 – for
religion. Figure 1 shows the scatter plots of the two indices of segregation (i.e., S˜ and Ŝ) for each of the three
dimensions of diversity. As one would expect, ethnic and linguistic segregation indices are highly correlated;
in fact, by construction, they are identical in 46 countries. These are the countries in which people identify
with ethnic groups on the basis of language differences. Correlation between segregation by language or
ethnicity, on the one hand, and by religion, on the other, is substantially lower, albeit also positive. (Figure
2 plots the segregation indices by ethnicity, language, and religion against each other.) Countries appear to
be more segregated in terms of ethnicity and language than in terms of religion. Segregation ranges from
0 to 0.39 in terms of ethnicity with a mean value of 0.10 and from 0 to 0.49 with a mean of 0.11 in terms
of language; whereas religious segregation ranges from 0 to 0.27 with a mean of 0.05 (all according to Ŝ).
As shown in the left column of Figure 3, the indices of segregation are positively correlated with the indices
of fractionalization at the national level for ethnicity and language (with pairwise correlation coefficients of
11To get rid of a few outliers in terms of the number of subgroups of “others” (O), we cut off the distribution of O across
countries at the 95th percentile, i.e., we redefine O to be equal to the 95th percentile of the distribution of O across countries
when it is larger than the 95th percentile of this distribution.
12Since
PN
m=1 pim 6= 1 and N < M , both the numerator and the denominator in eS are smaller than in S.
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0.42 and 0.36, respectively) and uncorrelated for religion (with a correlation coefficient of 0.01).
The most striking fact about segregation across countries is its relationship with the level of development.
Poor countries are on average twice as segregated as rich countries in terms of all three dimensions of diversity.
The mean value of ethnic segregation is 0.11 for countries with per capita GDP below Slovenia, which is often
considered to be the poorest rich country; in contrast, the mean of ethnic segregation is 0.04 for countries
with per capita GDP above or equal to Slovenia; for linguistic segregation the corresponding figures are 0.12
vs. 0.07; and for religious segregation – 0.05 vs. 0.02. The very few rich countries which are ethnically
highly segregated are Spain, Belgium and Israel and none of them are among the ten most segregated
countries. Arguably, these countries face the most difficult ethnic conflicts within the developed world. The
most religiously segregated rich countries are the Netherlands, Israel, and Japan and their rank among all
countries is below 17. It would appear that the ability or willingness to reduce segregation is increasing
in GDP per capita. Correlation coefficients of log per capita GDP with ethnic, linguistic, and religious
segregation are −0.35, −0.23, and −0.31, respectively. The right column of Figure 3 presents scatter plots
of segregation indices against log per capita GDP.
Controlling for per capita GDP and fractionalization (both of which are correlated with segregation, as
we point out), Latin American countries are on average the most ethnically and linguistically segregated
and the least segregated in terms of religion. Interestingly, there are no significant differences in the level of
segregation between Africa and Asia. Transition countries are less segregated than non-transition countries
in terms of ethnicity and language, while they do not differ terms of religious segregation.
Table 1 shows the most and the least segregated countries along with their segregation and fractional-
ization coefficients. In the Appendix, we report summary statistics for the segregation indices (Panel A of
Table A.2) and the table of correlations between them (Table A.3).13
5 Correlation: Segregation and Governance
We now look at the correlation of our measures of segregation with what are, by now, standard measures
of the quality of government, namely, the World Bank’s Governance Indicators: Voice and accountability,
13To conserve space, in each of these tables, in addition to the indices of segregation we summarize the instruments used for
these indices. The instruments are described below in the Section 6.
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Political stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, and Control of corruption. The
data, detailed definitions and sources for each of these variables are presented at www.govindicators.org (see
also Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999, 2002 and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006). As a
baseline, we take the mean value of each governance indicator for each country for years 1996-2005. Our
results do not depend on which particular year to take.
Different governance indicators are very highly correlated with each other, with pairwise correlation
coefficients never falling below 0.77. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to disentangle different dimensions of
the quality of government in a cross-section of countries. Throughout the analysis we carry all six governance
indicators with us, knowing well, however, that each one of them is not truly an independent observation.
In Table 2, we present pairwise correlation coefficients between the quality of government indicators and our
six measures of segregation (Ŝ and S˜ for language, ethnicity and religion). All of the correlation coefficients
are negative, and their magnitude is quite high, i.e., more segregation is associated with lower quality
of government; in some cases, correlation exceeds 0.5 in absolute value. This is not surprising, however,
considering that the quality of government goes hand-in-hand with the level of development and the level of
fractionalization.
Therefore, we are primarily interested in establishing whether segregation is associated with governance
conditional on fractionalization and the level of development. To study partial correlations, we run simple
OLS regressions of the following form:
Qi = α+ βSi + γFi + δ′Xi + εi,
where i indexes countries, Q stands for a governance indicator; S and F are segregation and fractionalization
indices, respectively; X is a vector of additional covariates (described below); and ε is a heteroscedastic error.
We run these regressions separately for the three dimensions of diversity: ethnicity, language, and religion.
In Table 3, we present results for the rule of law as dependent variable and Ŝ as the measure of seg-
regation. First, consider regressions in which the right-hand side includes only the indices of segregation
and fractionalization (the results are presented in columns (1), (3) and (5)). For all dimensions of diversity,
the index of segregation in these regressions enters negatively with the coefficient statistically different from
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0, at least at the 5% level of confidence. The index of fractionalization is also negative and significant in
regressions for ethnic and linguistic diversity, while it is positive and marginally significant for religion. The
results on fractionalization are in line with findings by Alesina et al. (2003). Religious affiliation can be
“forced” upon individuals. In many countries, religious freedom is limited or non-existent, and therefore, a
high level of religious homogeneity is artificially imposed by law, and this is more likely when governments
are “bad.”14
Columns (2), (4) and (6) add a set of regressors standard in the literature (for the early studies, see,
e.g., La Porta et al. 1999 and Treisman 2000; for a survey of more recent work on the subject see Treisman
2007). The most important covariate is, of course, log of GDP per capita, since measures of institutional
development and government quality are highly correlated with per capita income. We also control for log
population size and the average size of country’s regions, i.e., the jurisdictions at the level of which we
measure segregation. These controls are important because the size of countries and their jurisdictions may
have a direct effect on the quality of government and the size of the jurisdictions within countries is inversely
related to our measure of segregation: as the size of jurisdictions decrease, segregation indices increase.
In addition, the list of controls includes democratic tradition, and two geographical variables: latitude (a
common control for adverse climate conditions) and a measure of the extent to which country’s surface is
covered by mountains. We added mountains to the list of covariates because, on the one hand, the level
of segregation may depend on physical constraints to mobility and, on the other hand, harsh terrain may
make government policies less effective. We also add legal origin dummies to the list of controls following
the insights by La Porta et al. (1999). Finally, in order to capture Weberian ideas, we control for the shares
of main religions in the population (see, for instance, La Porta et al. 1997). Definitions of control variables,
their sources, and summary statistics are reported in Tables A.2 and A.4.
Ethnic and linguistic segregation continues to be negatively (and significantly, at the 5% level) associated
with the rule of law after the inclusion of control variables (columns (2) and (4)); whereas the coefficient
on religious segregation becomes small and statistically insignificant. Fractionalization loses significance in
all regressions with control variables. It is, in particular, the inclusion of GDP per capita that makes the
14The same problem may apply to forced linguistic and ethnic assimilation, but it is less common.
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index of fractionalization insignificant in this regression, a result consistent with La Porta et al. (1999).
Note, however, that whether or not one wants to control for GDP per capita in these types of regressions is
debatable, since per capita income may be endogenous to ethnic fractionalization and segregation (see, e.g.,
Hall and Jones 1999). In any case, our index of segregation remains significant even after controlling for GDP
per capita. As for the control variables, with the exception of GDP per capita and democratic tradition, none
of the controls is statistically significant consistently across regressions; the legal origin variables, however,
are always jointly significant. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between segregation indices and the rule
of law with residual scatter plots conditional on all covariates.
In Tables 4 and 5, we report abbreviated results of the same regressions as in Table 3 for all the quality of
government indicators. We show the results for the segregation indices Ŝ; the OLS results for S˜ are almost
identical and available upon request. Each table has three panels. The first two panels report results of
regressions with all control variables (Panel A) and with fractionalization and segregation indices as the only
regressors (Panel B). Panel C presents results for a subset of countries which excludes dictatorships, defined
as countries with an average Polity IV democracy score less than one for the years 1975-2004.15
Not surprisingly, the pattern of results obtained for the rule of law in Table 3 generalizes to all the other
quality of government indicators. Let us discuss ethnic and linguistic diversity first. Fractionalization is
negative and significant only in regressions without control variables. In contrast, measures of linguistic
and ethnic segregation are negatively associated with the quality of government indicators in regressions
both with and without controls. Coefficients on segregation are negative in all regressions. In regressions
without additional covariates, segregation is significant in all cases but one, namely, linguistic segregation
for regulatory quality. In the full sample with all controls, coefficients on segregation are statistically sig-
nificant for voice, political stability, and the rule of law indices, and are insignificant for regulatory quality,
government effectiveness, and control over corruption. In the sub-sample of democracies, the results on
ethnic and linguistic segregation are stronger: the coefficients are larger in absolute value while standard
errors are smaller compared to the full sample regressions. The coefficients on segregation in the sub-sample
of democracies are statistically significant in regressions for all governance indicators with the exception of
15The Polity IV democracy score is the democ variable taken from www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2006.xls.
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linguistic segregation for regulatory quality. The result that segregation is more strongly associated with the
quality of government in the sample of democracies does not depend on the definition of democracy.16 The
stronger effect of segregation in democracies is to be expected if ethnic voting is an important channel of
influence. Below we present some evidence that segregation increases ethnic voting.
As for the case of religious diversity, religious segregation is not associated with any measures of the
quality of government once control variables are included; whereas coefficients on religious fractionalization
are positive and in some regressions statistically significant.17
6 Causal Inference: the Effect of Segregation
6.1 Description of the instrument
The level of segregation depends upon where people live, and this choice is endogenous to politico-economic
forces. Certainly, major events like civil wars, revolutions or large regional economic shocks may lead to
massive migrations. People may also move in response to more “minor” events, such as changes in the level
of local taxation or public goods (Tiebout 1956). How much people actually move in response to changes in
local policies can be debated. For example, in many developing countries, individuals face serious economic
barriers to mobility. Yet, if the quality of government (and, in particular, rule of law) is very low at the
national level, ethnic and religious groups may choose to live closer together to provide local public goods
such as security, order, and socioeconomic infrastructure in a more homogeneous environment with higher
social capital. This gives rise to a reverse causality going from the quality of government to segregation.
In addition, the index of segregation depends on internal administrative boundaries, which, in turn, are
at government’s discretion. For example, in 1956 India undertook a major reform, known as the States
Reorganization Act, to redraw internal boundaries along linguistic lines. As unobserved factors may deter-
16For example, the results are just as strong for the substantially more restrictive definition of democracy adopted in Persson
and Tabellini (2003).
17An alternative measure of segregation that we came across is a so-called “relative diversity”: R =
1
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m. If groups have different sizes, R gives a higher weight to segregation of larger
groups, whereas S gives equal weight to segregation of all groups. Correlation of segregation measures based on the formula for
R with the quality of government is negative but much weaker than that of S. This has a theoretical underpinning: segregation
in smaller groups has an important effect on the quality of government by means of affecting the relationship between minorities
and majorities. This effect is ignored in R. In the rest of the paper, we focus on S as a measure of segregation.
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mine both the internal borders and politico-economic outcomes, there is also an omitted variables problem
in interpreting the correlation between segregation and the quality of government as causal.
We propose and compute an instrument for segregation which relates spatial distribution of groups in
a country to the composition of major groups present in neighboring countries. In a nutshell, we make
a prediction about the location of people belonging to each group in each country, assuming that people
belonging to a particular group “gravitate” towards the borders of countries that are populated by people
from the same group. Based on the predicted location of members of each group, we construct an index of
predicted segregation, which we use as an instrument for the actual segregation.
The idea behind predicting the location of groups is as follows: If a particular group in the home country
is also present in one of the neighboring countries, it is likely that this group will live closer to the border
with the country populated by the same group. Conversely, if a group in the home country is not present in
any of the neighboring countries, it is less likely to concentrate near any particular border and, therefore, will
be spread more uniformly across the country. Note that this could be due to a natural historical formation
of borders cutting across large areas populated by a particular ethnic or religious group (e.g., the border
drawn between Austria and Italy after WWI that left a German-speaking population in the Tyrolean part
of Northern Italy). This could also be due to a gradual spread out of a particular language or religion across
borders (e.g., adopted from colonizers or missionaries). But it also could be due to an awkward drawing of
borders that split groups into two adjoining countries (e.g., in many African states).18
An example in Figure 5 illustrates the basic logic of the instrument. Consider a home country HC1 with
four groups, A,B,C and D. Suppose that this country has four neighboring countries, all fully homogeneous
and populated by each one of the four groups. The predicted segregation of HC1 would be 1, since each of
the four groups of the home country would cluster near the border of the neighboring country populated by
the same group. Consider now another home country HC2 with the same groups but surrounded by four
countries without any members of groups A,B,C or D. In this case, the predicted segregation of the home
country would be 0, since the four groups in the HC2 have no “gravitation” to any of the borders.
18See MacMillan (2003) for an excellent discussion of this kind of problem created by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which
redesigned the world’s borders after WWI. The idea of a “wrong” border splitting an ethnic group into two neighboring countries
underlies the empirical work on “artificial states” by Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2009). We discuss the relationship
between our instrument and measures of “artificial states” in detail in section 9.
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The procedure for calculation of the predicted segregation index is as follows. Let the home country
have K neighboring countries, assume that it is divided into K hypothetical regions. We construct a
predicted distribution of people into these hypothetical regions, assuming that members of each group
“gravitate” towards those regions that border countries where their own group constitutes a larger share
of the population. Finally, we calculate the predicted index of segregation on the basis of this predicted
distribution and use it as an instrument for segregation. Note that the “size” of a hypothetical region is
its population share, and since the segregation index does not depend on population density, the borders of
these K hypothetical regions are inconsequential.
The calculation of predicted distribution takes several steps. First, we match all groups in each home
country to the “major” groups in the neighboring countries. The question of which groups in two neighboring
countries “match” is often not so simple. We have adopted a mechanical procedure based upon the definition
of groups.19 We defined a “major” group as a group with size greater or equal to 10% of the country’s
population. “Major” groups are unlikely to be formed due to cross-border migrations from the home country.
Thus, our focus on the major groups corrects for the possibility of relatively small cross-border migrations
and makes the instrument less likely to be contaminated by the policies of the home country. The key
assumption required for excludability of our instrument is that the quality of government in the home
country does not affect major groups in the neighboring countries. Obviously, a state collapse leading to a
massive cross-border migration would cause problems for our instrument, but this is a very rare event.
As the second step, we construct the predicted distribution of groups in the home country across hypo-
thetical regions. Let tmk be the number of people from group m predicted to be located in the hypothetical
region k of the home country. If none of the neighboring countries has group m as one of its major groups,
people from group m are divided equally among all hypothetical regions. Formally,
tmk = piHCm T
HC 1
K
,
where piHCm is the fraction of group m in the home country; T
HC is the home country’s total population;
and K is the total number of neighboring countries and, thus, of hypothetical regions. In the case when at
19Yet even the most mechanical “matching” procedure in some countries calls for judgment.
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least one of the neighboring countries has group m as a major group, we predict the following distribution:
tmk = piHCm T
HC pi
k
m
K∑
j=1
pijm
, (1)
where pikm is the fraction of group m in the neighboring country that borders hypothetical region k. Therefore,
pikmP
j pi
j
m
has a simple interpretation of the force of gravity, which is increasing in the fraction of group m in
the neighboring country k relative to the fractions of group m in the other neighboring countries. It is easy
to see that if fractions of group m in all neighboring countries are the same, the predicted number of people
from group m will be the same in each region. If only one neighboring country has group m among its major
groups, the whole group m of the home country is predicted to be located in the hypothetical region bordering
this country. Note that we ignore the neighboring countries with population smaller than one hundredth of
the size of the home country on the grounds that they should have little gravity. This eliminates from the
calculation such neighboring states as San Marino for Italy, Liechtenstein for Switzerland, and Andorra for
Spain.
Figure 6 illustrates how the predicted distribution of groups across hypothetical regions is constructed
using the example of the religious composition of Switzerland. Switzerland has Catholic, Protestant, Muslim,
Jewish, and non-religious populations. It has borders with France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Liechten-
stein. Since Liechtenstein is too small to have any gravity force, we divide Switzerland into four hypothetical
regions, i.e., F , G, A, and I named after the first letter of the respective (large enough) neighboring country.
Germany is the only country neighboring Switzerland with Protestants as a major religious group; therefore,
we predict all of the Switzerland’s protestant population (37% of the total population) to be located in the
region G. Italy, Austria, and France have sizable not religious populations, while the share of non-religious
population in Germany is below 10% and, therefore, it is not a major group. Thus, we predict that the
non-religious population of Switzerland will be divided between regions I, A, and F according to the relative
shares of non-religious populations in Italy, Austria, and France (5% of the total population in region I,
3.5% in region A, and 3% in region F ). We predict Catholics to be located in all four hypothetical regions,
as they form a major group in all the neighboring states. Region I is predicted to have the largest number of
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Catholics because the fraction of Catholics in Italy is higher than in the other neighboring countries. Since
Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Jews do not form a major group in any of Switzerland’s neighbors, we
predict members of these groups to be located in all hypothetical regions in equal proportions.20
The outlined procedure yields a predicted distribution of groups among hypothetical regions, which has,
however, an important undesirable property. The population size of the individual hypothetical regions is
not restricted in any way (apart from the fact that the sum of regional populations equals the population
of the home country). As a result, in some countries, predicted population of some hypothetical regions
may be very small and uniform. This happens when a tiny group s of the home country is matched to a
major group in one of the neighboring countries k and no other group from the home country is matched to
any other group in the neighboring country k, at the same time, all other groups in the home country are
matched with groups in other neighboring countries. In this case, the segregation index on the basis of this
predicted distribution will be very high because the tiny group s will be the only group in the hypothetical
region k and it will be perfectly segregated so that no other hypothetical region will have members of group
s.
In reality, regions are sufficiently large that none of the tiny groups can form a homogenous region and
segregation of tiny groups does not have a large effect on the segregation indices. Thus, we introduce a
lower bound to the population size of hypothetical regions. We postulate that the share of the population of
any hypothetical region cannot be smaller than the average of the shares of the smallest real regions across
countries, namely, 2.7% of the total country’s population. Therefore, as the next step, we augment the
predicted distribution of groups across hypothetical regions. If a hypothetical region has a predicted size
smaller than the lower bound, we “re-settle” people from other hypothetical regions that are bigger than
the threshold to this region proportionally so that each person in the sending regions has equal probability
to be “re-settled.” In other words, we increase the population of the smallest region to reach the lower
bound, so that the populations of all bigger regions decrease, but the fractions of different groups in each
of these other regions remains constant. If none of the hypothetical regions have predicted population less
than the critical value, we do not augment the predicted distribution. The number of countries in which
20In Section 9, we discuss the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions behind the construction of predicted
distribution of groups across hypothetical regions.
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“re-settlement” occurs is: 18 for ethnicity; 19 for language; and 10 for religion.21 Finally, we calculate the
predicted segregation indices S˜ and Ŝ using the resulting predicted distributions. For all countries which
have no neighbors, e.g., islands, or have just one neighbor, e.g., Portugal and Denmark, we set predicted S˜
and Ŝ to be zero, as our logic predicts the distribution of all groups to be uniform. The indices of predicted
segregation are summarized in Panel C of Table A.2.
Does predicted segregation have the power to predict actual segregation? Table A.3 presents uncondi-
tional pairwise correlations between segregation indices and the instruments: they are always positive and
range between 0.3 and 0.6. However, in order for predicted segregation to serve as an instrument for the
actual segregation, it has to have sufficient predictive power conditional on all covariates. Table 6 reports
the results of the first stage regressions of the form:
Si = α+ βS
p
i + γFi + δ
′Xi + εi,
where Spi is a measure of predicted segregation. Panel A presents first stage results for Ŝ and Panel B for
S˜. For both measures of segregation, Ŝ and S˜, the instrument is a strong (and significant) predictor of the
actual segregation. The instrument has a higher predictive power for index Ŝ than for S˜. Figure 7 shows
residual scatter plots of the predicted versus actual segregation conditional on covariates (the measure used
for the plots in the left column is Ŝ and in the right column – S˜). The last two columns in each of the panels
of Table 6 report F-statistics for the excluded instrument (Spi ).
22 They are sufficiently high for Ŝ. In the
case of S˜, in some regressions the instrument is weak; particularly, this is the case for the linguistic diversity.
This happens because of one outlier—the US. The US is the only country for which the predicted segregation
is equal to one (in the case of linguistic diversity), as the Spanish-speaking population is predicted to reside
next to Mexico, while the English-speaking population is predicted to reside next to Canada (the only two
countries bordering the US by land). In Panel C of Table 6, we report the first stage for linguistic S˜ in the
subsample that excludes the US: the instrument is not weak in this subsample. We address the problem of
weak instrument for S˜ in Section 9.
21Among these countries, the median number of hypothetical regions with too small populations is 1 for ethnicity and religion
and 3 for language; the mean number is between 2 and 3 for all dimensions of diversity.
22We report these F-statistics calculated both under the assumption of heteroscedastic and homoscedastic ε, even though
the latter is certainly an incorrect assumption. The reason for reporting both is that the theory of weak instruments, which
generated the cut off points for the weak instruments, is developed only for the homoscedastic case (see, for instance, Stock et
al. 2002).
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6.2 Results
In Tables 7, 8, and 9, we present the results of the second stage regressions for Ŝ. These tables are organized
in the same way as OLS tables 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Table 7 displays the full regression output for the
rule of law outcome in regressions with all controls and with no controls except for fractionalization. As
with OLS, in 2SLS regressions, the coefficient on segregation is negative and significant at the 5% level in
the second stage for ethnicity and language when all controls are included, whereas religious segregation is
insignificant. Table 8 shows that ethnic and linguistic segregation has a negative significant effect on all
governance indicators without exception in the sample of democracies, and with just a couple of exceptions
(voice for ethnicity; and regulatory quality and control of corruption for language) in the full sample. The
effect of religious segregation disappears once control variables are included in contrast to the effects of ethnic
and linguistic segregation. Figure 8 illustrates the second stage relationship with residual scatter plots.
To understand the size of the effect of segregation on governance, consider the example of linguistic
diversity. In the full sample, a move from the mean level of linguistic segregation to a perfect intermix,
which is equivalent to a decrease of 1 standard deviation (SD), leads to improvements in the indices of
political stability and voice of about 0.3 points, in government effectiveness of 0.16 points, and in the rule of
law of about 0.2 points.23 The effect of ethnic segregation is a little higher for most governance indicators.
In addition, in the sample which excludes autocracies, the magnitude of the effect of ethnic and linguistic
segregation is larger than in the full sample for all governance indicators with the exception of political
stability index. The magnitude of coefficients on ethnic and linguistic segregation in the 2SLS regressions
is consistently higher than that of OLS. This could be due both to the endogeneity of segregation and to
measurement error.
All the 2SLS results that we have described are for Ŝ measure of segregation. For ethnic and religious
dimensions of diversity, the results of the second stage are very similar both in terms of magnitude and
statistical significance when we consider S˜ instead of Ŝ. For linguistic diversity, however, the results of the
second stage in the case of S˜ are weaker in terms of statistical significance with the same magnitude of
coefficients. The main difference is as follows: segregation is significant for three instead of four outcomes
23Governance indicators have standard deviations equal to unity.
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(voice, political stability, and the rule of law). The results for S˜ are available from the authors.
7 Alternative Measures of the Quality of Government
The World Bank’s Governance Indicators which we have used so far to measure the quality of government
are the most commonly used but not the only available measures. In this section, we explore whether a
similar relationship exists between segregation and alternatives measures of the quality of government.
In theory, there are two distinct dimensions of the quality of government (see, for instance, La Porta
et al. 1999): (1) the extent of government’s intervention into the economy—measured by such variables as
the security of private property rights and the extent of regulation—and (2) the efficiency of government,
or the quality of bureaucracy—measured, for instance, by corruption indicators. Empirically, however, it
is hard to separate the two dimensions of the quality of government in a cross-section of countries because
countries with interventionist governments also often have less efficient bureaucracy (and vise versa), as the
correlation between the two groups of variables is very high.
Following La Porta et al. (1999), we take property rights index and business regulation index from
the Index of Economic Freedom, 2009 (www.heritage.org) and top marginal tax rate from the Economic
Freedom of the World, 2008 (www.freetheworld.com) to measure government’s intervention. As measures of
government efficiency, we take corruption perception index (CPI, average for 1994-2006) from Transparency
International (www.transparency.org), freedom from corruption index from Index of Economic Freedom, 2009
(www.heritage.org), tax compliance index from the Global Competitiveness Report, 1996, and bureaucratic
delays index (average for 1972-1994) from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence’s (BERI) Operation
Risk Index (www.beri.com). In addition, we take another commonly used composite index of the quality
of government from the Political Risk Services Group’s (PRS) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
which combines “Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy Quality” ICRG ratings.24
All of these measures of the quality of government are highly and significantly correlated with each other
and with the World Bank Governance Indicators. The correlation is statistically significant irrespective of
whether we condition on other covariates (Si, Fi, and Xi). Thus, our baseline measures—the World Bank
Governance Indicators—reflect both the intervention and efficiency dimensions of the quality of government.
24These measures (although some for earlier years) are described in detail in La Porta et al. (1999).
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We repeat our analysis for each of the other measures. We find that top marginal tax rate and bureaucratic
delays index are not robustly related to segregation.25 The results for the other indices are summarized in
Table 10 for ethnic segregation and Table 11 for linguistic segregation. For each of the six measures of the
quality of government, we report OLS and 2SLS results of two specifications: (1) with full sample and no
controls with the exception of fractionalization and (2) with democracy sample and all controls. We find
that in OLS regressions ethnic segregation is significantly negatively correlated with all considered indices
with the exception of regulation index, tax compliance index, and TI corruption index (the latter only for
the sample of democracies). Ethnic segregation also has a significant negative causal effect in the second
stage on all considered indices with the exception of TI CPI index in the sample of democracies with all
controls and tax compliance index in both specifications (the instrument, however, is weak in the case of tax
compliance as the sample is reduced due to data availability). The results for linguistic segregation are very
similar for OLS and statistically weaker for 2SLS. In the 2SLS, linguistic segregation has a significant effect
only on the EF freedom from corruption index and EF property rights index in the sample of democracies.
As above, there is no significant effect of religious segregation on any of the alternative measures of the
quality of government.
Overall, the results are broadly consistent with our previous finding that ethnic and linguistic segrega-
tion have a negative impact on the quality of government; but not all results are statistically significant.
Furthermore, we find a negative impact of ethnic and linguistic segregation on measures of both dimensions
of the quality of government.
8 Ethnic parties
In this section, we make a first step towards investigation of the channels through which segregation affects
the quality of government. In particular, we document the positive relationship between ethnic segregation
and the presence of ethnic parties. As a measure of ethnic parties, we use a dummy indicating whether a
country had an ethnic party participating in the last legislative elections which got a non-trivial percentage
of the vote. We use definition of the ethnic party in line with Horowitz (1985) and Chandra (2005). Namely,
25It is worth noting that bureaucratic delays index is available for only few countries, i.e., 48 countries with ethnic segregation
data and 42 countries with linguistic segregation data.
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we deem a political party to be ethnic if it “appeals to voters as the champion of the interests of one
ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others, and makes such an appeal central to its
mobilizing strategy. The key aspect of this definition is exclusion. An ethnic party may champion the
interests of more than one ethnic category, but only by identifying the common ethnic enemy to be excluded”
(Chandra 2005 p. 236).26 We used two sources of data on legislative elections: (1) Constituency-Level
Elections (CLE) Dataset (collected by Dawn Brancati 2007; www.cle.wustl.edu) and (2) Psephos Adam Carr’s
Election Archive (2008; http://psephos.adamcarr.net). The resulting data set includes 90 countries from our
sample with ethnic segregation data, 30 of which have ethnic parties. Figure 9 presents an unconditional
non-parametric relationship between ethnic party dummy, on the one hand, and our measures of actual
and predicted ethnic segregation, on the other hand (the figure depicts the results of a locally weighted
regressions with bandwidth=0.8). The share of countries with ethnic parties monotonically increases with
ethnic segregation, both actual and predicted. Table 12 presents the results of probit regressions conditional
on various covariates including the level of development and fractionalization. These regressions confirm
that segregation has a positive significant effect on the probability of ethnic parties in the full sample and in
the sample that excludes dictatorships in both probit and instrumental variables (IV) probit specifications.
The magnitude of the effect is as follows: a move from an average level of segregation to a perfect intermix
which is approximately equal to a decrease of one standard deviation leads to a decrease in the probability of
having an ethnic party of 35 percentage points (using IV probit estimates). The relationship between ethnic
segregation and ethnic parties suggests that ethnic voting is an important channel through which segregation
affects the quality of government. Yet, coefficients on segregation in regressions for the quality of government
remain negative and statistically significant after we include ethnic party dummy as an additional covariate
directly in our baseline specification. This suggests that ethnic voting may not be the only channel. Other
potential mechanisms, which we discussed in the section 2, may be just as important. Due to the lack of
data, so far, we cannot test for the importance of these alternative mechanisms. Future research may tackle
these issues using our data on segregation.
26Similar definition is given on page 299 of Horowitz (1985) book.
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9 Sensitivity
In this section, we further investigate the robustness of our results.
9.1 Artificial states and the same ethnic group on both sides of a national
border
Our main identification assumption, i.e., exclusion restriction, is as follows: the predicted segregation calcu-
lated based on information on group composition of neighboring states is unrelated to home country outcomes
(and, particularly, the quality of government) other than through its relationship with the home country’s
actual segregation. Yet, one could argue that (especially) in many African countries, borders were drawn
by colonizers without paying much attention to the historical location of different ethnic groups and some of
these borders cut right across them (Alesina et al. 2009). On the one hand, as Alesina et al. (2009) argue,
this colonizer’s disregard to the local conditions must have had a direct effect on such country’s outcomes
as government quality. On the other hand, it is also related to predicted segregation, as it yields a situation
in which the same ethnic group resides in the two neighboring countries. In addition, it is conceivable that
the presence of a major ethnic group in a neighboring country which also constitutes a minority in the home
country, in addition to its effect through segregation, may have a direct effect on the quality of government
of the home country even when the states are not “artificial.” The presence of the same group on both sides
of the national border may, for instance, shape domestic policies towards the neighboring state.27
We conduct several exercises to verify that our results do not depend on so-called “artificial states” or
the direct effect of the presence of the same ethnic groups in neighboring countries. In particular, we try to
control directly for the two alternative measures of artificial borders suggested by Alesina et al. (2009), one
of which also directly addresses the issue of having the same ethnic group in the two neighboring countries.
The first of the two measures is a measure of how straight the country border is (note that many African
countries have borders which are straight lines). The variable is described in detail in Alesina et al. (2009).
This variable is uncorrelated with either actual or predicted segregation. Our results are unaffected by
the inclusion of this control variable (both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance of the effect
segregation and the predictive power of the instrument).
27For a model of external political influence of foreign parties on domestic politics see Antras and Padro i Miguel (2008).
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The second measure used by Alesina et al. (2009) is the share of the home country’s population which
belongs to ethnic groups also represented in neighboring countries which are likely to form the same nation.
Alesina et al. (2009) “match” ethnic groups across borders just as we do in order to construct our instrument.
There is one important difference in our approach to matching groups across borders and that of Alesina
et al. (2009). While matching groups across borders they make a judgement on whether a certain group
present on both sides of a border can potentially make a single nation, e.g., they do not consider groups
having the same skin color or the same language in Latin America as the same group. Our approach to
matching groups across borders is a more mechanical one and we match groups across borders on the basis
of all available characteristics.
Thus, in order to check whether our results are driven by the presence of the same ethnic groups on
both sides of a national border, we conduct two additional tests. First, we control for the second measure
of artificial borders constructed by Alesina et al. (2009). Alternatively, we control for the share of ethnic,
linguistic, and religious populations that match across borders according to our own “mechanical” criterion.
Note that in addition to truly “artificial” states these measures depict also the states which were formed
naturally but have representatives of the same groups in neighboring countries. In addition, we try controlling
for a dummy indicating the presence of the same groups in the home and neighboring countries. As one would
expect, these variables are positively correlated with our predicted segregation.28 Nevertheless, our results
are robust to controlling for the share of home country’s population which is represented in neighboring states
and a dummy for a non-zero share irrespective of which matching criteria are applied. The only notable
difference between the results with and without these control variables is in the F-statistics for the excluded
instrument from the first stage, they do drop once each of these control variables is included. Nonetheless,
for the Ŝ measure of segregation, they still remain sufficiently strong not to worry about weakness of the
instrument. Thus, we conclude that our results are not driven by these alternative stories.
28Note that the predicted segregation is more highly correlated with the shares of “partitioned groups” calculated based on
our own matching compared to correlation with the Alesina et al. (2009) measure as predicted segregation is zero if there are
no groups matched across the borders.
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9.2 Conflicts
Matuszeski and Schneider (2006) document a positive correlation between various measures of prevalence of
civil conflicts and their measure of spacial linguistic segregation. For the present paper, it is important to
make sure that our results are not driven by the omission of civil conflict variables. Thus, we verified that our
results are unaffected if we control for various measures of duration and intensity of conflicts. In addition,
we repeated our analysis excluding countries which experienced civil conflicts. When all countries that
had at least one civil conflict since WWII are excluded, our results for the quality of government become
insignificant, possibly, due to a dramatic (over forty percent) reduction in the number of observations.
However, our baseline results are robust to excluding countries that had conflicts since 1990.
9.3 Additional covariates and different samples
We have made a number of additional robustness checks to make sure that our results are not driven
by an omitted variable. In particular, we included the following covariates which potentially could vary
systematically with the level of segregation and the quality of government: 1) dummies for large geographical
areas, i.e., East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, North
America, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa; 2) a dummy indicating whether a country is
a former colony; 3) the share of country’s population living in urban areas (this could be important since
group mixing is more likely in the cities and, at the same time, countries with higher urbanization usually
are more developed); 4) a dummy indicating countries surrounded by water (this control could be important
because by construction our instrument always predicts zero segregation for such countries); 5) a measure of
the extent to which a country is covered by rivers or other in-land bodies of water and the standard deviation
of the elevation within country borders (as both rivers and mountains affect the costs of mobility); 6) the
share of population which belongs to the “other” group (as it affects the Ŝ measure and could be related to
the quality of statistics in the country, which, in turn, may be related to the overall quality of government);
and 7) the number of groups as it enters our segregation measures and also may be related to the quality of
country’s statistics. The results of both the OLS and IV regressions are practically unaffected by inclusion
of these additional covariates.
We checked that our results do not depend on the quality of the data on the sub-national group composi-
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tion: we re-ran all regressions for the sample of countries with good-quality data, and the results are robust.
We also verified that the results are robust to the exclusion of OECD countries and/or transition countries
from the sample as well as controlling for OECD and transition country dummies.
9.4 Influential observations
The results are robust to the exclusion of any one particular country from the sample. The two most
influential observations (which affect the results in favor of our story) are Chile (which has low ethnic
segregation and very high quality of government conditional on other covariates) and Zimbabwe (which has
very high ethnic segregation and low government quality). If we exclude both Chile and Zimbabwe from the
sample, the results become weaker. Nonetheless, in the sample that excludes dictatorships, the coefficient on
ethnic segregation remains statistically significant for government effectiveness, the rule of law, and control of
corruption in IV regressions and for voice, political stability, the rule of law and control of corruption in the
OLS regressions. Moreover, Chile and Zimbabwe have a countervailing force in the second stage regressions
for ethnic diversity: Bulgaria and Russia are very influential observations, but they work against our story.
Excluding Bulgaria (which has a relatively high quality of government and an extremely high predicted
ethnic segregation) and Russia (where both predicted ethnic segregation and the quality of government are
low) strengthens the negative effect of ethnic segregation on government quality.
Linguistic segregation also has a statistically significant negative effect on voice, political stability, the rule
of law and control of corruption in the OLS regressions without Chile and Zimbabwe. But the instruments
become weak in the second stage. Yet, once we exclude the USA—the most influential observation in the
first stage—in addition to Chile and Zimbabwe, the instrument for language becomes strong enough, and
then the statistically significant results are obtained in the second stage regressions for voice and political
stability. We conclude that the effect of segregation cannot be explained by the presence of outliers.
9.5 Instrument
We have also examined the sensitivity of the results to our instrument by experimenting with different ways of
constructing it. First, we recalculated it taking into account tiny states such as San Marino and Liechtenstein
and got almost exactly the same results. Second, we constructed an instrument which treats a border with an
ocean (or sea) as an additional neighbor with no gravity force, i.e., as if the ocean were another neighboring
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country with none of the home country groups represented. And again, we got very similar results to the
baseline.29 Third, we constructed the predicted segregation of groups across hypothetical regions in which
the gravity force is based on the relative number of people in each group in neighboring countries instead
of the relative fractions of groups (i.e., taking the population size of neighbors into account). In particular,
the gravity force parameter from the equation 1 was replaced by pi
k
mT
kP
j pi
j
mT j
, where T k is the total population
of the neighboring country k. The results for language are the same, while the results for ethnicity are a
little weaker statistically in the first and the second stage. Nonetheless, in the second stage, the results for
ethnicity remain statistically significant for political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law.
It is worth noting that the two approaches to the “gravity force” of segregation (i.e., whether it depends
on the number and on the proportion of people belonging to the same group in the neighboring countries)
imply different mechanisms of segregation. Our baseline instrument implies that people prefer to reside next
to countries where their group is relatively more important (e.g., has larger political representation); the
alternative approach implies that the actual number of group members matters. As both of these mechanisms
could be at play, it is reassuring that the results are qualitatively similar irrespective of which approach is
taken.
It is important to note that for the vast majority of countries, the baseline instrument is very similar
to all other versions of the instrument that we tried (i.e., with taking tiny states or the sea into account,
or with gravity force based on the number of people). But there are a few exceptions. The list of the
countries for which there are large differences in the predicted segregation between the baseline and at least
one of the alternative instruments is as follows: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Israel,
Jordan, Latvia, Mexico, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Spain. We re-estimated the 2SLS regressions excluding
all these countries from the sample and the results turned out to be robust. Despite the reduction in the
sample size, the first stage works well for Ŝ and the second stage yields the following results. Linguistic
segregation has a negative significant effect on voice, political stability, government effectiveness and the rule
of law (and on all outcomes without exception in the sub-sample of democracies); while ethnic segregation
29The main difference between the results is that the instrument which takes the sea border into account has a better
predictive power in the case of language (because the predicted segregation decreases for the USA and becomes much closer
to what it actually is); and it has worse predictive power in the case of ethnicity (because the predicted segregation for Brazil
increases substantially and becomes a very poor predictor of the actual Brazil’s segregation).
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has a negative significant effect on political stability and government effectiveness. (Control of corruption is
also significant, but only in the sub-sample of democracies.) In addition, we estimated all our instrumental
variable regressions with Generalized Method of Moments instead of 2SLS and got very similar results with
stronger statistical significance.
We also considered the weakness of the S˜ instrument. As we already mentioned, the strength of the
predictive power of the instrument for language segregation measured by S˜ strongly depends on the inclusion
of the US in the sample. As the scatter plot in the middle row of Figure 7 shows, the US is a very influential
observation in the first stage: it has very high predicted segregation, while its actual segregation is not that
high. The US is the only country with predicted segregation measured by S˜ equal to one. If one excludes the
US from the sample, F-statistics for the S˜ are sufficiently large (as reported in the Panel C of Table 6), while
the coefficient on linguistic segregation in the second stage remains negative and statistically significant for
voice, political stability, and the rule of law.
Our instrument is based on predicted segregation of groups across as many hypothetical regions as
there are neighboring countries. We have verified that including the number of neighboring countries as
additional control variable does not affect our results in the second stage and only slightly decreases statistical
significance of the excluded instrument in the first stage. The reason we do not include this covariate in
the baseline specification is because it has no correlation with the measures of the quality of government
whatsoever and, therefore, just adds noise to the right hand side.
10 Conclusions
This paper achieves three goals. First, it has provided a new data set on composition of ethnic, linguistic and
religious groups at the sub-national level for about 90 countries which can be used to study a wide variety
of politico-economic questions previously out of reach for an empirical researcher. Second, it has suggested
an instrument for segregation in a country based on the composition of groups in the home and neighboring
countries. Third, it has shown that more ethnic and linguistic segregation is associated with significantly
lower government quality, holding fractionalization constant both in the OLS and 2SLS regressions. The
effect of ethnic and linguistic segregation on the quality of government is stronger in a subset of democracies.
The results are robust to inclusion of an extensive list of controls, alternative definitions of segregation, and
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exclusion of influential observations.
Thus, our results show that if two countries have the same level of fractionalization at the national level,
quality of government is lower in the more ethnically segregated country, i.e., in the country where different
ethnic groups live relatively more apart. Several arguments may explain this finding, and future research
may investigate the channels more precisely, either with cross-country studies or by focusing on specific
countries. One argument is that groups living apart do not develop a commonality of goals and views that
would allow better policymaking. Also, geographic concentration of groups may exacerbate ethnically- and
geographically-based suboptimal policies at the expense of good governance at the national level. Ethnic
voting may be easier to organize and may favor the selection of politicians on the basis of geographic and
ethnic characteristics, rather than quality. In some cases, secession threats may force the central government
to focus on repression or appeasement, subtracting resources from more productive use.
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Figure 1: Segregation indices S˜ and Ŝ
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Figure 3: Segregation and fractionalization (left); Segregation and per capita GDP (right)
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Figure 4: Residual scatter plots for rule of law and segregation (OLS)
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Figure 5: Predicted location of groups
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Figure 7: Predictive power of the instrument conditional on all controls
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Figure 8: Residual scatter plots for the rule of law and segregation (second stage of 2SLS)
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Ŝ
F
Ŝ
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Table 3: Segregation and the rule of law, OLS regressions
Rule of law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Segregation (ethnicity) -2.50*** -1.20**
[0.72] [0.52]
Fractionalization (ethnicity) -1.20*** 0.01
[0.28] [0.22]
Segregation (language) -1.84** -1.15**
[0.71] [0.46]
Fractionalization (language) -1.00*** 0.22
[0.33] [0.22]
Segregation (religion) -4.53*** 0.03
[1.33] [0.93]
Fractionalization (religion) 0.76* 0.36
[0.42] [0.25]
ln (population) -0.12 -0.11 -0.12
[0.07] [0.07] [0.09]
ln (GDP per capita) 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.41***
[0.07] [0.08] [0.07]
ln (average size of region) 0.11 0.1 0.08
[0.08] [0.08] [0.11]
Protestants share 0.007** 0.005 0.003
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
Muslims share 0.002 0.001 0
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Catholics share -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Latitude 0.2 0.49 0.78
[0.44] [0.48] [0.58]
English legal origin 0.2 0.12 0.08
[0.13] [0.17] [0.15]
German legal origin 0.38** 0.29 0.36**
[0.16] [0.19] [0.18]
Socialist legal origin -0.35* -0.43* -0.34
[0.18] [0.22] [0.22]
Scandinavian legal origin -0.06 -0.07 0.00
[0.28] [0.38] [0.00]
Democratic tradition 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
Mountains 0.09 0.22 0.03
[0.16] [0.17] [0.20]
Constant 0.79*** -4.25*** 0.53*** -4.32*** -0.2 -3.38***
[0.17] [0.80] [0.20] [0.77] [0.18] [0.75]
Observations 97 97 92 92 78 78
R-squared 0.24 0.88 0.15 0.87 0.12 0.84
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: First stage: Segregation and predicted segregation
Panel A: Segregation index Ŝ
Full sample; All controls Full sample; No controls Democ sample; All controls
EŜ LŜ RŜ EŜ LŜ RŜ EŜ LŜ RŜ
Instrument 0.47*** 0.30*** 0.22*** 0.49*** 0.32*** 0.25*** 0.51*** 0.31** 0.27***
[0.12] [0.11] [0.06] [0.12] [0.07] [0.07] [0.13] [0.12] [0.06]
Fract-n 0.10** 0.14*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.15*** -0.01 0.08* 0.13*** 0.02
[0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.05] [0.03]
Obs. 97 92 78 97 92 78 77 75 64
R-squared 0.57 0.48 0.60 0.39 0.31 0.34 0.59 0.43 0.63
F-stat (het) 15.59 8.39 16.08 17.04 18.28 14.96 14.91 7.04 22.24
F-stat (hom) 31.46 17.22 29.49 33.21 23.22 38.64 34.36 14.01 26.03
Panel B: Segregation Index S˜
Full sample; All controls Full sample; No controls Democ sample; All controls
ES˜ LS˜ RS˜ ES˜ LS˜ RS˜ ES˜ LS˜ RS˜
Instrument 0.34*** 0.21 0.19*** 0.35*** 0.20** 0.21*** 0.39*** 0.18 0.24***
[0.12] [0.13] [0.05] [0.12] [0.09] [0.06] [0.14] [0.14] [0.06]
Fract-n 0.17*** 0.25*** 0.04 0.20*** 0.29*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.26*** 0.04
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.02] [0.05] [0.06] [0.03]
Obs. 97 92 78 97 92 78 77 75 64
R-squared 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.34 0.36 0.25 0.55 0.52 0.60
F-stat (het) 7.89 2.68 15.06 8.31 5.30 13.08 8.29 1.66 16.32
F-stat (hom) 13.62 8.55 21.78 13.84 9.37 24.92 15.55 5.26 22.44
Panel C: Segregation Index S˜ for language with sample excluding the US
No US; All controls No US; No controls Dem, no US; All controls
LS˜ LS˜ LS˜
Instrument 0.38*** 0.27*** 0.37***
[0.08] [0.08] [0.09]
Fract-n 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.25***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Obs. 91 91 74
R-squared 0.618 0.391 0.629
F-stat (het) 21.53 11.17 16.78
F-stat (hom) 24.03 13.85 19.44
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. “F-stat (het)” reports F-statistics for the excluded instrument from the
first stage under the assumption of heteroscedasticity; and “F-stat (hom)” – under the assumption of
homoscedasticity. “E” – ethnicity; “L” – language; “R” – religion.
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Table 7: Segregation and the rule of law, the second stage of the 2SLS regressions
Rule of law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Segregation (ethnicity) -3.88** -2.47***
[1.75] [0.67]
Fractionalization (ethnicity) -0.97** 0.18
[0.38] [0.25]
Segregation (language) -1.14 -1.80**
[2.08] [0.78]
Fractionalization (language) -1.11*** 0.31
[0.42] [0.24]
Segregation (religion) -6.65** -0.87
[2.92] [1.98]
Fractionalization (religion) 0.76* 0.4
[0.43] [0.25]
ln (population) -0.06 -0.08 -0.08
[0.08] [0.09] [0.12]
ln (GDP per capita) 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.40***
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
ln (average size of region) 0.06 0.07 0.05
[0.09] [0.10] [0.13]
Protestants share 0.006* 0.005 0.003
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Muslims share 0.003 0.001 0
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Catholics share -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Latitude 0.15 0.56 0.73
[0.45] [0.49] [0.58]
English legal origin 0.2 0.1 0.1
[0.14] [0.18] [0.16]
German legal origin 0.35* 0.21 0.36*
[0.18] [0.21] [0.19]
Socialist legal origin -0.42** -0.50** -0.3
[0.19] [0.24] [0.23]
Scandinavian legal origin 0.04 -0.12 0
[0.30] [0.40] [0.00]
Democratic tradition 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
Mountains 0.13 0.26 0.003
[0.17] [0.18] [0.204]
Constant 0.84*** -4.28*** 0.49** -4.35*** -0.1 -3.34***
[0.18] [0.86] [0.22] [0.79] [0.20] [0.74]
Observations 97 97 92 92 78 78
R-squared 0.23 0.866 0.147 0.869 0.1 0.837
F-stat (het) 17.04 15.59 18.28 8.392 14.96 16.08
F-stat (hom) 33.21 31.46 23.22 17.22 38.64 29.49
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** signif-
icant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. “F-stat (het)” reports F-statistics for the excluded instrument from
the first stage under the assumption of heteroscedasticity; and “F-stat (hom)” – under the assumption of
homoscedasticity.
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Table 10: Ethnic segregation and alternative measures of government quality
Dep. var. ICRG quality of TI corruption EF corruption
government index index
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
E Ŝ -0.53*** -0.73* -4.17*** -6.57* -45.57*** -77.44**
[0.18] [0.39] [1.47] [3.89] [15.26] [37.08]
E F -0.25*** -0.21** -2.73*** -2.36*** -29.10*** -24.08***
[0.07] [0.08] [0.63] [0.80] [6.22] [7.97]
Obs. 85 85 96 96 96 96
F-het 15.49 16.23 32.75
F-hom 30.31 32.75 16.23
R-sqrd 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.20
Specification Full sample, no additional controls
E Ŝ -0.35** -0.44** -1.53 -1.91 -21.24* -36.46**
[0.17] [0.21] [1.09] [1.55] [11.88] [17.58]
E F 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.67 2.68
[0.07] [0.08] [0.56] [0.59] [5.20] [6.12]
Obs. 69 69 77 77 77 77
F-het 13.19 14.91 14.91
F-hom 27.59 34.36 34.36
R-sqrd 0.84 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Specification Democracies sample, all controls
Dep. var. EF Property EF Regulatrion Tax evasion
rights index index index
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
E Ŝ -61.49*** -102.25** -24.22 -62.49* -4.44*** -3.85
[19.15] [51.40] [16.45] [32.97] [1.12] [2.59]
E F -22.68*** -16.26 -25.04*** -19.01** 0.1 -0.01
[7.01] [10.49] [5.66] [7.37] [0.69] [0.81]
Obs. 96 96 96 96 41 41
F-het 16.23 16.23 17.13
F-hom 32.75 32.75 13.45
R-sqrd 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.18
Specification Full sample, no additional controls
E Ŝ -41.89* -75.49*** -14.6 -51.30* -2.08 -5.78
[22.54] [27.42] [21.68] [27.76] [1.50] [3.55]
E F 2.8 7.24 -2.99 1.86 -0.33 0.08
[7.64] [8.85] [7.53] [8.30] [0.63] [0.79]
Obs. 77 77 77 77 39 39
F-het 14.91 14.91 5.457
F-hom 34.36 34.36 3.436
R-sqrd 0.80 0.79 0.68 0.65 0.72 0.66
Specification Democracies sample, all controls
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** signif-
icant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. “F-stat(het)” reports F-statistics for the excluded instrument from
the first stage under the assumption of heteroscedasticity; and “F-stat(hom)” – under the assumption of
homoscedasticity.
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Table 11: Linguistic segregation and alternative measures of government quality
Dep. var. ICRG quality of TI corruption EF corruption
government index index
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
L Ŝ -0.36* 0.09 -3.08** -0.52 -32.40** -10.67
[0.18] [0.61] [1.51] [4.81] [15.61] [47.03]
L F -0.24*** -0.31*** -2.23*** -2.60*** -23.85*** -27.02***
[0.08] [0.11] [0.73] [0.90] [7.39] [8.78]
Obs. 79 79 91 91 91 91
F-het 16.41 15.52 15.52
F-hom 12.99 19.65 19.65
R-sqrd 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13
Specification Full sample, no additional controls
L Ŝ -0.34* -0.49 -1.76 -2.04 -25.71** -48.49**
[0.17] [0.32] [1.07] [2.22] [10.75] [21.33]
L F 0.11 0.13 0.31 0.35 3.35 6.52
[0.09] [0.09] [0.57] [0.55] [5.48] [6.15]
Obs. 66 66 75 75 75 75
F-het 4.54 7.04 7.04
F-hom 8.30 14.01 14.01
R-sqrd 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.88
Specification Democracies sample, all controls
Dep. var. EF Property EF Regulatrion Tax evasion
rights index index index
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
L Ŝ -50.92*** -11.5 -15.31 -10.1 -4.73*** -1.06
[17.77] [62.79] [15.89] [42.47] [1.32] [3.62]
L F -19.01** -24.77** -22.55*** -23.31*** -0.01 -0.61
[7.95] [11.27] [6.05] [7.77] [0.67] [0.78]
Obs. 91 91 91 91 33 33
F-het 15.52 15.52 9.93
F-hom 19.65 19.65 6.78
R-sqrd 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.11
Specification Full sample, no additional controls
L Ŝ -53.12*** -66.84** -4.9 -46.3 -1.65 -0.97
[19.20] [29.89] [19.57] [33.35] [1.72] [2.98]
L F 4.8 6.71 -1.09 4.67 -0.06 -0.13
[7.64] [8.01] [7.01] [8.74] [0.78] [0.78]
Obs. 75 75 75 75 32 32
F-het 7.04 7.04 3.83
F-hom 14.01 14.01 3.92
R-sqrd 0.80 0.80 0.69 0.64 0.76 0.76
Specification Democracies sample, all controls
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** signif-
icant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. “F-stat(het)” reports F-statistics for the excluded instrument from
the first stage under the assumption of heteroscedasticity; and “F-stat(hom)” – under the assumption of
homoscedasticity.
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Table 12: Segregation and ethnic parties, Probit and IV Probit regressions
Ethnic party dummy
Probit Probit Probit VI Probit VI Probit VI Probit
Segregation (ethnicity) 2.338* 5.174*** 6.254*** 6.696*** 11.290*** 11.573***
[1.281] [1.693] [1.906] [1.610] [2.268] [2.588]
Marginal effect (0.85) (1.80) (2.17) (2.82) (3.54) (3.33)
Fractionalization (ethnicity) -0.986 -0.136 -1.789*** -0.996
[0.731] [0.810] [0.688] [0.778]
Marginal effect (-0.34) (-0.05) (-0.48) (-0.21)
ln (GDP per capita) -0.226 -0.107 -0.195 -0.11
[0.225] [0.321] [0.213] [0.306]
ln (Population) 0.024 0.035 -0.037 -0.012
[0.102] [0.122] [0.098] [0.122]
English legal origin 1.655 0.926 1.904** 1.178
[1.107] [1.215] [0.884] [1.006]
Socialist legal origin 2.326* 1.558 2.831*** 1.890*
[1.193] [1.331] [0.974] [1.104]
French legal origin 1.171 -0.2 1.5 0.058
[1.208] [1.356] [1.021] [1.132]
German legal origin 0.958 0.174 1.55 0.604
[1.257] [1.316] [0.975] [1.043]
Protestants share 0.011 0.001 0.016 0.005
[0.012] [0.014] [0.011] [0.012]
Catholics share -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 -0.006
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Muslims share 0.004 0.002 0 -0.002
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
Democratic tradition 0.144* 0.135 0.136** 0.142
[0.074] [0.098] [0.067] [0.094]
Constant -0.663*** -1.333 -1.92 -0.992*** -0.929 -1.373
[0.189] [2.778] [3.117] [0.174] [2.510] [2.901]
Observations 90 90 75 90 90 75
Sample Full Full Democ Full Full Democ
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity in brackets. Marginal effects in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table reports results for Ŝ; the results
for S˜ are almost identical.
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A Data Appendix
Table A.1: Sources of data on group composition
Country Ethnicity Language Religion
Afghanistan Lang NSO (www.mrrd.gov.af) .
Argentina INDEC (www.indec.mecon.ar) . .
Armenia Census (www.armstat.am) Census (www.armstat.am) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Australia Lang Census (www.abs.gov.au) Census (www.abs.gov.au)
Austria NSO (www.statistik.at) NSO (www.statistik.at) NSO (www.statistik.at)
Bahrain Census (www.bahrain.gov.bh) . .
Bangladesh NSO (www.bbsgov.org) Ethn NSO (www.bbsgov.org)
Belarus Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) .
Belgium Lang www.eurolang.net .
Belize Census
(www.statisticsbelize.org.bz)
Census
(www.statisticsbelize.org.bz)
Census
(www.statisticsbelize.org.bz)
Benin DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Bolivia Census (www.ine.gov.bo) Census (www.ine.gov.bo) .
Brazil Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Bulgaria Census (www.nsi.bg) Census (www.nsi.bg) Census (www.nsi.bg)
Burkina Faso DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Cambodia Lang Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Cameroon DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Canada Census (www.statcan.ca) Census (www.statcan.ca) Census (www.statcan.ca)
Central African Rep. DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Chile Census (www.ine.cl) Ethn Census (www.ine.cl)
China Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Ethn .
Colombia Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Ethn .
Costa Rica Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) .
Cote D’Ivoire DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Croatia Census (www.dzs.hr) Census (www.dzs.hr) Census (www.dzs.hr)
Czech Rep. Census (www.czso.cz) Ethn Census (www.czso.cz)
Denmark Council of Europe report Ethn .
Dominican Rep. . . DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Ecuador Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) .
Egypt . . DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Estonia Census (http://pub.stat.ee) Census (http://pub.stat.ee) Census (http://pub.stat.ee)
Ethiopia DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Finland Lang NSO (www.stat.fi) .
France INED, Population, 2004
(www.ined.fr)
. .
Gabon DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Germany NSO (www-ec.destatis.de) . .
Ghana DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Greece NSO (www.statistics.gr) . .
Guatemala DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Guinea DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Haiti . DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Honduras Census (www.ine-hn.org) Ethn .
Hungary Census (www.nepszamlalas.hu) Census (www.nepszamlalas.hu) Census (www.nepszamlalas.hu)
Iceland NSO (www.statice.is) Ethn .
India DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Indonesia Census (www.bps.go.id) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Census (www.bps.go.id)
Iran . . NSO (www.sci.org.ir)
Ireland Census (www.cso.ie) . Census (www.cso.ie)
Israel NSO (www1.cbs.gov.il) . NSO (www1.cbs.gov.il)
Italy NSO (www.dossierimmigrazione.it) NSO (www.dossierimmigrazione.it) .
Japan Census (www.stat.go.jp) Ethn Census (www.stat.go.jp)
Jordan Census (www.dos.gov.jo) . .
Kazakhstan NSO (http://en.government.kz) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Kenya DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Korea NSO (www.kosis.kr) Ethn NSO (www.kosis.kr)
Continued to the next page
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Continued from the previous page
Country Ethnicity Language Religion
Kyrgyzstan DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Latvia NSO (www.csb.lv) NSO (www.csb.lv) .
Lesotho Lang DHS (www.measuredhs.com) .
Lithuania NSO (www.stat.gov.lt) Ethn NSO (www.stat.gov.lt)
Macedonia NSO (www.stat.gov.mk) Ethn .
Madagascar . . DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Malawi Lang NSO (www.nso.malawi.net) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Mali DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Mauritius . NSO (www.gov.mu) NSO (www.gov.mu)
Mexico Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Morocco Lang Census (www.statistic-hcp.ma) .
Mozambique . DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Namibia . Census
(www.npc.gov.na/census/index.htm)
DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Nepal Census (www.cbs.gov.np) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Netherlands NSO (www.cbs.nl) . NSO (www.cbs.nl)
New Zealand Census (www.stats.govt.nz) Census (www.stats.govt.nz) Census (www.stats.govt.nz)
Nicaragua . Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Niger NSO (www.stat-niger.org/) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Nigeria . DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Norway Census (http://statbank.ssb.no) Ethn .
Pakistan Lang Census (www.statpak.gov.pk) Census (www.statpak.gov.pk)
Panama Census
(http://censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr)
Ethn .
Paraguay Census (http://www.dgeec.gov.py) Census (http://www.dgeec.gov.py) Census (http://www.dgeec.gov.py)
Peru DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Census (www.inei.gob.pe/) Census (www.inei.gob.pe/)
Philippines Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Portugal NSO (www.sef.pt) Ethn NSO (www.sef.pt)
Qatar Census (www.planning.gov.qa) . Census (www.planning.gov.qa)
Romania Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Russia Census (www.perepis2002.ru) Census (www.perepis2002.ru) Census (www.perepis2002.ru)
Rwanda DHS (www.measuredhs.com) NSO (www.statisticsrwanda.gov.rw) NSO (www.statisticsrwanda.gov.rw)
Sao Tome . . Census (www.ine.st)
Saudi Arabia NSO (www.cds.gov.sa) Ethn .
Senegal DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Slovakia Census (http://portal.statistics.sk) Ethn Census (http://portal.statistics.sk)
Slovenia Census (www.stat.si) Census (www.stat.si) Census (www.stat.si)
South Africa Lang Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Spain Lang Centro De Investigaciones Sociolog-
icas (www.cis.es)
.
Sri Lanka NSO (www.statistics.gov.lk) . NSO (www.statistics.gov.lk)
Sweden NSO (www.ssd.scb.se) Ethn .
Switzerland Lang Piguet, E. and Wanner P., Popula-
tion Studies 31, 2000.
Piguet, E. and Wanner P., Popula-
tion Studies 31, 2000.
Taiwan NSO (http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw) . .
Tajikistan NSO (www.stat.tj) Ethn .
Tanzania DHS (www.measuredhs.com) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Thailand . Census (web.nso.go.th) Census (web.nso.go.th)
Togo DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Turkey Multu, Servet (Int. J. Middle East
Stud., 28, 1996)
Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Uganda NSO (www.ubos.org) Ethn DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Ukraine Census (www.ukrcensus.gov.ua) Census (www.ukrcensus.gov.ua) .
United Kingdom Council of Europe report Council of Europe report Council of Europe report
Usa Census (www.census.gov) Census (www.census.gov) Census (www.census.gov)
Uzbekistan DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Vietnam Census (www.ipums.umn.edu) Ethn Census (www.ipums.umn.edu)
Zambia DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Zimbabwe Lang DHS (www.measuredhs.com) DHS (www.measuredhs.com)
Note: “NSO” – National Statistical Office; “DHS” – Demographics and Health Survey. “Lang” means
that language data were used for ethnicity and “Enth” means that ethnicity data were used for language.
This happens when there are no independent sources of regional-level data for language and ethnicity and, at
the same time, national-level statistics on ethnic and linguistic diversity coincide. More detailed information
about the data sources is available from the authors upon request.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics
variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Panel A: Segregation and Fractionalization Indices
Segregation (ethnicity) S˜ 97 0.12 0.12 0 0.49
Segregation (ethnicity) Ŝ 97 0.10 0.11 0 0.39
Segregation (language) S˜ 92 0.16 0.14 0 0.56
Segregation (language) Ŝ 92 0.11 0.11 0 0.49
Segregation (religion) S˜ 78 0.06 0.06 0 0.28
Segregation (religion) Ŝ 78 0.05 0.06 0 0.27
Fractionalization (ethnicity) 97 0.37 0.27 0 0.92
Fractionalization (language) 93 0.36 0.27 0 0.89
Fractionalization (religion) 78 0.43 0.24 0 0.83
Panel B: Dependent and control variables
Voice and accountability 109 0.07 0.93 -1.63 1.54
Political stability 109 -0.11 0.88 -2.26 1.48
Government effectiveness 109 0.13 1.00 -1.46 2.29
Regulatory quality 109 0.15 0.86 -2.12 1.67
Rule of law 109 0.05 1.00 -1.68 2.07
Control of corruption 109 0.06 1.06 -1.41 2.47
ln (population) 109 16.41 1.57 11.84 20.95
ln (GDP per capita) 109 8.53 1.20 6.27 10.41
Protestants share 109 12.96 22.38 0 97.80
Muslims share 109 19.61 33.04 0 99.40
Catholics share 109 34.09 36.76 0 96.90
Latitude 109 0.32 0.20 0 0.72
English legal origin 109 0.25 0.43 0 1
French legal origin 109 0.44 0.50 0 1
German legal origin 109 0.06 0.23 0 1
Socialist legal origin 109 0.21 0.41 0 1
Scandinavian legal origin 109 0.05 0.21 0 1
Democratic tradition 109 4.86 3.62 0 10
Mountains 109 0.28 0.26 0 0.94
Panel C: Instrumental variables
Predicted S˜ (ethnicity) 97 0.08 0.11 0 0.49
Predicted Ŝ (ethnicity) 97 0.06 0.10 0 0.47
Predicted S˜ (language) 92 0.12 0.19 0 1
Predicted Ŝ (language) 92 0.09 0.15 0 0.86
Predicted S˜ (religion) 78 0.11 0.15 0 0.79
Predicted Ŝ (religion) 78 0.09 0.14 0 0.75
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Table A.4: Sources of control variables
Variable Definition
ln (Population) Natural log of population in the country. Average for the years 1995-2004. Source:
World Development Indicators 2006.
ln (GDP per capita) Natural log of GDP in constant 2000 international dollars per capita. Average for
the years 1995-2004. Source: World Development Indicators 2006. For initial value
of GDP per capita we use natural log of GDP in constant 2000 international dollars
per capita. Average for the years 1975-1980. Source: World Development Indicators
2006.
Religion Identifies the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the three
most widely spread religions in the world in 1980. For countries of recent formation,
the data is available for 1990-95. The numbers are in percent (scale from 0 to 100).
The three religions identified here are: (1) Romanic Catholic; (2) Protestant; and
(3) Muslim. Source: La Porta et. al. (1998). Original sources: World Christian
Encyclopedia 1982, Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations 1995, Statistical Abstract of
the World 1995, Demographic Yearbook 1995, CIA World Factbook 1996
Legal origin Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country.
There are five possible origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial
Code; (3) German Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; and (5)
Socialist/Communist laws. Source: La Porta et. al. (1998). Original sources: CIA
World Factbook 1996.
Latitude The absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and
1. Source: La Porta et. al. (1998). Original source: CIA World Factbook 1996
Democratic tradition Democracy score index. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower values indicating a less demo-
cratic environment. Average for the years 1975-2004. Source: Polity IV Project:
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2006.
Fertility Fertility rate (births per woman). Average for the years 1975-2004. Source: World
Development Indicators 2006.
Investment Investment share as % of GDP. Average for the years 1975-2004. Source: Penn World
Table 6.2.
Openness Export plus Import as % of GDP. Average for the years 1975-2004. Source: Penn
World Table 6.2.
Mountains Measure of mountains in the country. Source: William Easterly’s data.
Colonial origin Identifies countries that were colonized by a Western overseas colonial power since
1700 for at least 10 years. Source: Teorell and Hadenius (2005).
Region Identifies the region where the country is situated. There are six possible regions:
(1) East Asia and Pacific; (2) Europe and Central Asia; (3) Latin America and
Carribean; (3) Middle East and North Africa; (4) North America; (5) South Asia;
and (6) Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: World Bank.
Island Identifies countries that are situated on islands and therefore have no bordering coun-
tries. Source: CIA World Factbook 1996
OECD Identifies countries that are currently members of OECD. These countries are Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom, USA. Source: wikipedia.org.
Transition Identifies transition countries. These countries are Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Macedonia, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Source: wikipedia.org.
Partitioned Percent of the population of each country that belongs to groups partitioned by the
border. Source: Alesina et. al. (2006).
Squiggliness Log of basic fractal index based on World Vector Shoreline Dataset (GIS format).
This variable measures squiggliness of each country’s border. Source: Alesina et. al.
(2006).
Elevation Standard deviation of elevation of each country in meters. Source: GIS dataset.
Rivers Share of area of the country covered by large perennial bodies (rivers, lakes, seas).
Source: GIS dataset.
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